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Accounts of intentional agency typically assign beliefs a central role in the genesis of 
action. According to them, if someone acts with an intention, the person’s action is guided 
by her beliefs. The beliefs guide the action by directing the agent towards ways of 
achieving what she intends. In this respect, they help rationalize it. They explain the action 
by revealing the connection the person saw between what she did and what she intended 
with it. 1 
Slips are a challenge to this view. When you slip, you act with an intention, but you 
inadvertently end up doing something else. For example, in early January you write the 
wrong year on a check or, right after moving to a new place, you find yourself driving to 
the old one. Surely, you are aware that the year ended—New Year’s celebrations took place 
a few weeks ago—and you know that you just moved—you were actually coming back 
from returning the rental truck, but nevertheless, by acting out of habit you behave contrary 
to what you believe then. 
It might be tempting to resist the challenge in two different ways. One is to claim that 
slips are not really instances of acting with an intention. Another is to try to reduce the slip 
to a doxastic mistake. Here, I argue both ways of fending off the challenge fail, because 
they wind up mischaracterizing the mistake. In the slip the agent acts with an intention. But 
she does not act guided by her beliefs about how to execute it.  
                                                             
1 Versions of this idea can be found in Davidson (1980: 3-5, 85-86; 231-232; 266-267) and 
other causal approaches to agency (Audi 1994; Smith 2010; and Arpaly and Schroeder 
2014). Even detractors of the causal theory have seen doxastic guidance as a principle 
constitutive of it (See Ruben 2003). The idea, however, goes beyond this type of approach. 
There are Kantian (Korsgaard 1997) and volitionist (Ginet 1990; Wallace 2001) versions of 
it too. Here, I discuss the challenge in the context of a causal theory but the challenge is 
meant to be broader than this.  
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Alternatively, one might try to discount slips on the grounds that the principle was 
never meant to apply to them. Yet, as we shall see, this response fails too. Slips have a 
rational structure of the sort that accounts of intentional agency are meant to capture. They 
exhibit robust and regular patterns, which speaks against them being fortuitous glitches. 
Thus, by helping dissociate habitual from other ways of acting intentionally, slips help 
understand how habits can rationalize what we do.  
This last point is worth emphasizing. Philosophical accounts of habitual action tend 
to be psychologically shallow; psychologists typically contrast the habitual and the 
intentional with each other.2 Thus, at present we have no theoretical account of how a 
psychology of intentions can support everyday habitual action. The discussion of slips here 
obviously does not amount to a full theory but it helps sketch how such an account can go.  
The paper begins with a statement of the challenge, introduced with a real-life case 
that gets discussed throughout. Then, I proceed in two stages, discussing the ways of 
resisting the challenge mentioned above and using the conclusions reached at each stage to 
elaborate a view of the psychology behind the slip.  Only in the end, I say how the results 
obtained can be generalized into a fuller theory of everyday habitual action. Developing 
that theory, as the case discussed here illustrates, requires that we think harder about the 




                                                             
2 Although philosophers have said little about it, when habitual action has been discussed, it 
has often been presented as a counter-example to psychological conceptions of intentional 
agency (Pollard 2006; Di Nucci 2011. But see Douskos 2019 for a nice exception). 
Psychologists interested in automatic goal-pursuit have theorized to a slightly larger degree 
about habits. Aarts & Dijksterhuis (2000), for example, define habits are goal-response 
associations that become active without intent. Wood & Neal (2007) conceptualize them as 
stimulus-response associations that structure behavior without mediation of actual goals. 
While useful for capturing some forms of automaticity, these ways of thinking about habits 
are removed from interest in intentional agency.  
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On January 1st, 2009 police officer Johannes Mehserle shot Oscar Grant dead on a BART 
platform in Oakland, California. Mehserle didn’t intend to shoot Grant. Yet, after warning 
him loud and clear that he would be tased if he continued resisting arrest, the officer pinned 
him down, drew the weapon, and pulled the trigger once. Tragically, although Mehserle 
meant to reach for the taser, he instead reached for his gun.3  
From the perspective of the prosecution, the killing was intentional. They argue that it 
was unreasonable to suppose, as Mehserle claimed, that he had confused his gun with his 
taser. Although both weapons look alike, they feel very differently when held in your 
hands. Further, given that he was carrying them in opposite sides of his body, deploying 
each weapon required making very different physical movements. As a right-handed 
officer, he was carrying the gun in the right holster for a strong-side draw. He was carrying 
the taser in the left with the butt pointing forward in a cross-draw configuration. 
The defense, on the other hand, claimed that the killing was accidental. Mehserle had 
neither intentionally used a deadly weapon, nor evinced disregard for the outcomes of his 
actions. The killing was just the consequence of the training he had received. After many 
hours of rehearsal with a gun and no more than a few hours of taser training, he had 
internalized the routine of deploying the weapon in his right holster when subduing a 
suspect. In fact, for them, the confusion was the only explanation consistent with his 
behavior before and after the shooting. Immediately after it happened, Mehserle brought his 
hands to his head and exclaimed with disbelief, “Oh shit, oh shit, I shot him.”  
The case was, predictably, plagued with controversy. The prosecution, for example, 
argued that Grant was actually trying to comply with the officers’ orders when he was shot. 
Lying face down, his hands were just stuck under the weight of his body. Further, as the 
                                                             
3 For discussion of the case, see People vs. Mehserle, #A130654, 206 Cal. App. 4th 1125, 
142, Cal. Reprt. 3d 423 (2012). In what follows, I use the evidence and discussion 
documented in the court case as a guide to describe what happened that night in Oakland. 
Obviously, as with any other real-life case, the truth about Mehserle’s mental states might 
turn out to be somewhat different. Also, in following the court case, I do not mean to deny 
that police shootings (in the US and elsewhere) sometimes get falsely presented as non-
intentional. But exploring these larger issues concerning police brutality and their 
accountability for it is something beyond this essay.  
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District Attorney pointed out in his closing argument, the six cases of gun/taser confusions 
brought up by the defense involved a police officer carrying the weapons next to each 
other, not on opposite sides of his body. 
This was probably not the best choice for the District Attorney’s closing line. 
Between the trial and the sentencing, two further cases of gun/taser confusion were brought 
forward where the police officer was actually carrying the taser opposite to his gun. One of 
them occurred in Kentucky one year before the incident in Oakland, involving an officer 
with twice as much experience. According to the Court, the “unexpected” findings did not 
merit a new trial but they did bolster the defense’s argument. 
Catastrophic slips often look like intended behaviors, a manifestation of the agent’s 
ill will. This is a both a function of the “obviousness” of the mistakes, the harms they cause 
and, in some cases, the availability of potentially explanatory narratives. To point out the 
obvious, the case under discussion took place in the context of a well-documented history 
of police abuse and racial discrimination. So, many interpret Mehserle’s actions in that 
light. Once these details come in, however, things often look more complicated.  
Slips, as we shall see, are mistakes even from the point of view of those who make 
them. They are not, as Mehserle’s defense would have it, mere accidents that happen to us. 
If they were it would be hard to make sense of the fact that people tend to be held 
responsible for them. 4  Instead, they are instances of agency—specifically, instances of 
intentional agency. And whereas they do not necessarily impugn the intentions of the agent 
or her regard for the consequences of her actions, they are not simply unlucky events. To 
the contrary, as it will become apparent below, they often result from a long history of 
explicitly sanctioned behaviors. So, even if they are instances of individual agency, they 
speak too about the role that institutions can have in shaping what we do.  
Before proceeding, let me briefly introduce a methodological comment. Evidently, 
slips do not fit easily into the categories defined in our standard philosophical theories. But, 
as philosophers, I believe this is something that we ought to address. Mehserle’s slip is not 
a sanitized thought experiment concocted to rebut a piece of orthodox theory but a real-life 
                                                             
4 Calling something a “slip,” therefore, is not to excuse it or even to diminish the gravity of 
its occurrence. However, discussing responsibility (moral or legal) for slips is beyond the 
scope of this paper. See Amaya & Doris (2014) for discussion. 
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mistake that needs to be explained and, more importantly, that needs to be prevented from 
happening again. Hence, we must be able to say something about it that goes beyond the 
obvious platitudes. Clearly, in the absence of a detailed understanding of what kind of 
mistake it is and why it happened, it will be hard to devise effective ways of preventing 
further occurrences of it.  
 
Slips 
Let us begin then with a preliminary characterization of slips.  
Slips are common mistakes. You set out to do something that you normally know 
how to do, and yet, without changing your mind, you wind up doing something else. 
Fortunately, most slips are inconsequential; some are even endearing. My father, for 
instance, used to call me by the name of his youngest sibling. While they were growing up, 
looking after him was my father’s responsibility. 
In comparison, episodes of police officers shooting unarmed suspects due to gun/taser 
confusions are uncommon.5 Still, just looking at the institutional responses to these 
shootings, as opposed to deliberate ones, generate is enough to give one pause. Whereas 
Mehserle was ultimately convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to two years in prison, 
Darren Wilson, who intentionally shot Michael Brown several times in Ferguson, Missouri, 
was exonerated twice of criminal wrongdoing.  
Although slips come under different guises, they occur in discernible patterns 
(Norman 1981; Reason 1984; Amaya 2013). Every slip requires having an intention in 
mind, say, the intention to write a check to pay a bill, or to subdue a suspect by tasing him. 
Yet, what you do then is inappropriate in the light of that intention and the information you 
possess. You inadvertently date the check with the wrong year. Or you subdue the suspect 
by drawing the weapon from the wrong holster. Given the information you have, you wind 
up acting contrary to the intention behind your action.  
                                                             
5 Between 2001-2009, at least nine cases of gun/taser confusions were reported in the US, 
according to AELE Law library. See “Weapon Confusion and Civil Liability.” 2012 (6) 
AELE Mo. L. J. 101.  
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We can make this more precise if we think of slips as performance mistakes (Amaya 
& Doris 2014). In them, the error does not lie with your judgment or your willingness to 
stick to it but rather it lies with the way you carry your intention out. Thus, as a Chicago 
police officer did in April of 2009, you could decide to tase someone, judging wrongly that 
he is attacking you—he might be simply having a diabetic seizure. Or, as it occurred in 
Honolulu in September of 2010, you could get angry at a suspect, fail to exercise self-
restraint, and tase him for 30 straight seconds—the rule is not to exceed 5 second-bursts. 
These actions are surely mistakes. Neither, however, is a slip.  
Obviously, different mistakes can pile up on occasion. As the prosecution argued, it is 
likely that the attempt to arrest Grant was “cheap”: apart from a technicality, there was no 
probable cause. Some witnesses claimed that, after being warned of the arrest, he became 
cooperative. So, under those circumstances, even using a non-lethal weapon against him 
was unlawful. Mehserle and his partner, it seems, escalated a situation that could have 
easily been handled differently. Given how widespread racial prejudices are, these are live 
hypotheses. 6 Still, having made the decision to arrest and tase Grant, and having how 
pinned down on the ground, Mehserle made a further mistake in following a well-
internalized routine. In doing so, he slipped. 
Now, unlike other performance mistakes, slips do not involve a mere failure to 
implement an intention. They involve an incorrect implementation of an intention, which is 
something different. In the slip, you do not simply let the opportunity to act as intended go 
by; the intention actually prompts your behavior. You normally have the necessary skills to 
execute it correctly. And, typically, there are no external factors preventing you from doing 
it. The mistake, therefore, is not excusable by forgetfulness, lack of skill, or extreme 
hardship.  
Consider how Mehserle reached for his weapon. It was a display of well-coordinated, 
and skillful action. He warned Grant that he was going to tase him, he pinned him down, 
                                                             
6 In cases like this where there is limited amount of information, it is hard to know how 
influential these prejudices really were at the individual level (Payne at al. 2018). Even so, 
accepting what has been said so far, the presence of racial biases in Mesherle would help 
explain why he made the decision to subdue Grant but would not explain why, having 
made that decision, he slipped and grabbed the wrong weapon.  
 7 
shouted at his partner to clear the way, and pulled the trigger once. It was not as though he 
was forced to do any of this. He not did act fumblingly or in a physically awkward way. If 
Mehserle had intended to shoot Grant, he would have probably done something similar to 
what he did. 
 
Doxastic guidance 
Accounts of intentional agency often assign beliefs an essential role in the production of 
action. The approach can be traced back to Aristotle’s claim that actions are the conclusions 
of practical syllogisms. But it is also common among contemporary action theorists. 
Roughly put, the idea is that if someone acts with an intention, what the person does at the 
time is guided by her beliefs about how to achieve what she intends. The beliefs guide the 
action in the sense that they identify the means for achieving what is intended with it, 
explaining and rationalizing her behavior. For convenience, I shall call this the principle of 
doxastic guidance. 
Theorists who seek to reduce intentions to desires and beliefs have endorsed versions 
of the principle. Briefly, if intentions are combinations of desires and beliefs about how to 
satisfy them, acting with an intention seemingly requires acting in accordance with those 
beliefs. Still, one need not be a reductivist about intentions to agree with this. One might 
hold that intentions are sui generis states that guide action, but insist that they play this role 
by comprising plans that reflect the agent’s instrumental beliefs. 7  
Before getting into the discussion, we should get clear on what the principle of 
doxastic guidance claims. First, the principle concerns actions rationalized by personal-
level attitudes and states. Second, it concerns actions that have a teleological structure, in 
the sense that they are done for the sake of some end. It is, in other words, a claim about 
instrumental rationalization. The principle is meant to explain how, when an agent acts 
intending to achieve some result, what she does can be seen as instrumentally rational, at 
                                                             
7 Bishop (1989) and Enç (2003) provide examples of non-reductivist positions about 
intentions committed to a version of doxastic guidance. Mele & Moser (1994) are an 
exception: following Brand (1984) they claim that action plans need not be doxastically 
structured.   
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least from the position occupied by her. According to it, what plays this rationalizing role, 
connecting actions and intended ends, are the agent’s instrumental beliefs.  
There would seem to be various counter-examples to the principle. But given the 
clarification above, it is easy to see why they are merely apparent counter-examples. 
Consider, for instance, arational actions (Hursthouse 1991; Betzler 2009). Although these 
actions are not rationalized by instrumental beliefs, they do not seem to have a teleological 
structure. Hence, they are not counter-examples to doxastic guidance. Another case is 
skilled motor actions. To the extent that motor schemata control the fine details of skilled 
movements, beliefs might only indirectly guide them (Clarke 2011; Brownstein & 
Michaelson 2016). Being comprised of sub-personal representations, however, motor 
schemata are not suitable candidates for rationalization. 
Slips, by contrast, are exceptions to the principle. There you act with an intention to 
achieve some end, but your behavior fails to aligned with your beliefs about how that could 
be done. The behavior, in other words, has a teleological structure, given by personal-level 
attitudes and states, which rationalize it. But that structure cannot be reduced to what you 
intend and believe then. 8 As Mehserle’s case illustrates, in these cases what forges the 
connection between intention and action are not one’s beliefs but one’s acquired habits. 
It would certainly beg the question against doxastic guidance if the present challenge 
were to depend on an idiosyncratic account of belief. But it doesn’t. Here, beliefs need not 
even be identified with overt judgments, occurrent thoughts, or propositionally structured 
states. As we shall see, the patterns in which slips occur create problems for the relevant 
belief attribution, even granting a broad dispositional understanding of belief. Likewise, it 
would be unfair if the challenge presupposed a radical departure from standard ways of 
thinking about intentional agency, for instance, by severing its connection with acting for 
reasons. But it doesn’t. Habits, as understood here, are dispositions to execute intentions in 
                                                             
8 Obviously, even when a person slips, some beliefs will guide the execution of her action. 
The point is that the guidance is not exhausted by the agent’s beliefs; habits play a role too. 
That is why, as we shall discuss below, the slip cannot be reduced to a doxastic mistake.  
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ways which have worked in the past and that have been internalized through a process of 
rehearsal. 9 Acting habitually in this sense, as we shall see, is one way of acting for reasons. 
Advocates of the principle might respond to the challenge in, at least, two ways. First, 
they might claim that the slip is not a case of intentional agency. That is, they might accept 
that the person doesn’t act guided by her beliefs but deny, for various reasons, that the 
resulting behavior is one that qualifies for rationalization. Alternatively, they might argue 
that, even though the action isn’t in line with what the person would accept upon reflection, 
it is in line with (and, hence, rationalized by) her beliefs. Her beliefs, at least those that she 
had at the moment in which she slipped, just so happened not to be aligned with her more 
reflective attitudes.  
In what follows, I discuss prima facie plausible ways of developing these responses, 
showing why they are not as promising as they might initially seem. With respect to first 
kind of response, I argue that slips have an intentional description, that they are not 
instances of deviance or habitual interference, and that there is a robust sense in which they 
count as episodes of acting for reasons. With respect to the second, I show why the 
reduction of slips to doxastic mistakes is unworkable, once we take seriously the 
differences among the dispositions that make up habits and beliefs.  
 
Under a description 
We begin with the first kind of response. 
According to Donald Davidson’s famous dictum, if a person acts with an intention, 
the action can be described in a way in which it is intentional (1980: 46). Consider, to use 
his example, the navy officer who sinks the Bismarck by mistake, falsely believing that the 
Tirpitz (not the Bismark) is the approaching ship. Under the description “sinking the 
                                                             
9 Thus understood, habitual behaviors need not be observed with the frequency with which, 
say, some compulsive behaviors (e.g. biting one’s nails) can be seen. The frequency in 
which they are manifested, as it will become clear below, depends upon how often the 
person forms the type of intention the habit is supposed to subserve. See Douskos (2019: 
4312-4313), who uses for these purposes the term “habitual routines.”     
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Bismarck” his action is not intentional. It is intentional, though, if it is described as sinking 
the approaching ship. 
Some philosophers have argued that no intentional description of the slip can be 
given (Peabody 2005; Pollard 2006). Mehserle had the intention of subduing Grant. He 
deployed his gun by mistake. But, to the extent that he did not deploy it guided by false 
beliefs about it (say, where the taser was, etc.), it would seem that one cannot describe the 
mistake to make it come out as intentional. Thus, assuming the truth of Davidson’s dictum, 
we would not have a case of an agent acting with an intention. 
It’s easy to see where these philosophers are coming from. Unintentional descriptions 
of the slip are easy to come by. For example, Mehserle unintentionally shot Grant. Some 
ways of describing what he did are intentional, but are not descriptions of the mistake as 
such, say, Mehserle pinned down Grant and shouted at his partner to clear the way. Other 
descriptions are simply too general. Hence, it is not obvious that they make reference to the 
mistake and, if they do, whether they are intentional descriptions of it: Mehserle assaulted 
Grant, he subdued him, etc.   
It is possible, however, to find an intentional description by looking at how the 
actions in the slip unfolded. That is, instead of trying to describe the mistake in one sweep, 
one can focus on the actions that constitute it and describe it in a piecemeal fashion. To wit, 
Mehserle drew the weapon from his right holster, held it with both hands, and pulled the 
trigger. In doing these things he evidently made a mistake. Had he drawn the weapon from 
his left holster, say, or had he clubbed Grant with it, there would have not been a shooting. 
It would seem, nevertheless, that he did each of them intentionally. 
Notice, first, that these were not things that merely happened to him. The gun did not 
drop from his holster into his hands, or go off on its own. Also, they were not activities 
passively or idly undertaken. Mehserle did not draw the weapon and pull the trigger as one 
absently taps one’s foot while working in the computer (O’Shaughnessy 1980; Steward 
2009). Nor did he do these things reflexively as one extends one’s arms to break a fall 
(Brand 1984; Bratman 1987). As evidenced by his verbal warnings, he did them having an 
intention in mind. 
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Clearly, the execution of that intention was not thought through.10 Perhaps, at some 
point Mehserle pondered whether to deploy his taser. But, likely, he did not pause to think 
about how to deploy it. He grabbed the weapon in his right holster but didn’t ask himself 
which weapon was this. Instead, his actions were part of a routine that, as a police officer, 
he had internalized as part of his regular training. They were, in this regard, like the routine 
of pressing the clutch and shifting gears while driving. It was a script that allowed him to 
act without having to think about the details of his actions.  
Let me qualify this. To the extent that Mehserle didn’t shoot Grant on purpose, it 
would be a stretch to insist that he acted with the belief then that he had a gun in his hand. 
Also, as we shall discuss in detail below, it would problematic to say that he acted as he did 
because he believed he had the taser in his hand. Other than allegiance to doxastic 
guidance, attribution of this or similar beliefs seems gratuitous. It also creates problems 
interpreting Mehserle’s overall behavior. 
Yet, it is plausible to think that, under some description, Mehserle was aware of what 
he was doing. For one, he didn’t unconsciously follow the routine of drawing the weapon 
from his right holster and pulling the trigger, say, as one pulls the covers to one’s side of 
the bed in the middle of the night.11 For another, he didn’t draw the weapon from his right 
holster thinking that he was reaching for his pocket, or pull the trigger thinking that it was 
the safety. In fact, if any of these things had crossed his mind, given his intention to tase 
Grant, he would have pause to change course. 
It is precisely because of this that we get the desired description. Mehserle, we can 
agree, might have not known that he was about to shoot Grant. But he knew enough to be 
able to realize what he was about to do. Importantly, Mehserle was not merely aware that 
                                                             
10 See Douskos (2019), who distinguishes habits and skills, in these terms. In brief, the 
person who displays a skill is attentive to the way she is acting: how she is doing what she 
intends. The person who acts habitually is relatively unencumbered by the how of what she 
is doing. 
11 Although slips typically involve reduced attention to performance, this reduction does not 
result in some kind of unconsciousness antagonistic to intentional agency. See Bermúdez 
(2017), Christensen et al (2016), and Fridland (2014) for a discussion of how much 
consciousness there generally is in skilled and habitual behaviors. 
 12 
he was following this routine, as an spectator would have been, seeing things from a 
distance. He intended to subdue Grant and because of this he followed a routine he had 
internalized as part of his training. It was this, not simply a confusion on his part, that led to 
the shooting. 
Slips, then, are not just accidents; they are mistakes agents make. They are not 
passive doings; they occur because of the agent’s active intent. And they do not happen 
because the agent is unaware of the details of his doings—although they could have been 
avoided had the agent reflected more on what she knew. They are, instead, cases where one 
forms an intention and acts out of a habit or routine as a way of executing it. By acting 
habitually, one winds up making an error. Yet, to the extent that one acts habitually in the 
pursuit of the intention, one also winds up intentionally doing various things. 
 
Deviance 
For advocates of doxastic guidance the present considerations might not yet place slips 
squarely in the domain of agency. Perhaps they agree that slipping involves having an 
intention and acting habitually in response to it. However, for them, the fact that the agent 
didn’t act in line with her beliefs could be a sign that the “actions” were not brought about 
in the right way. That is, even though the intention moved the agent to act, it caused her 
behavior deviantly, in a way that prevents it from being intentional, even under the 
proposed descriptions.  
Causal deviance comes naturally in various forms. But, presumably, what matters 
here is what John Bishop (1989) calls “basic deviance.” There, the agent forms an 
intention, acts in response to it, but the action is not shaped by the content of the intention 
(what the intention is about). It is merely a causal response to it. Davidson’s mountain 
climber is the paradigmatic example: having formed the intention to let his falling partner 
go makes him so nervous that he accidentally loosens his grip and lets his partner go (1980: 
79). 
Slips are evidently different in some respects. In textbook cases of deviance, for 
instance, the behavior fits the agent’s intentions, whereas the lack of fit is what is most 
striking about the present case. Also, slips need not result from an overtaking emotion of 
the kind that standardly figures in examples of deviance. Even if the scene at the platform 
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startled Mehserle, as an experienced police officer it is unlikely that he was too nervous to 
act as he should have.  
We can, however, put these differences aside to properly address the objection. For, 
ultimately, the point of the comparison is not the agent’s emotional state or the ultimate 
success of her doings, but their problematic etiology. In brief, in both cases the behavior 
depends upon the intention: it is caused by it via a certain psychological process. But the 
fact that those processes result in those specific behaviors is accidental with respect to the 
things intended in each case. What the agent does, in this sense, is caused by the intention 
but not really shaped by its content.12   
Upon inspection, however, the similarity turns out to be only superficial. For, in the 
slip the content of the intention actually shapes how it gets executed, even if it doesn’t fully 
determine the execution. First, even though some of the actions in it fall short of being 
adequate, others are simply correct. Second, the habitual routines behind the mistake are, as 
a rule, semantically related to their guiding intentions. Over a wide range of possibilities, 
had the intention differed in content, the behavior would have differed accordingly. 
Various features of Mehserle’s case are telling in this regard. As the Judge explained 
in delivering the sentence, many of things he did were in accordance with his intention to 
subdue Grant with his taser. He moved back to gain some distance from him, which is 
consistent with the fact that tasers, unlike firearms, do not work at extremely close range. 
Also, he pulled the trigger only once. He did not “double” or “triple tap,” as police officers 
are trained to do when deploying their firearms.  
Importantly, Mehserle did not follow any random routine. He did not, say, reach into 
his back pocket for his wallet or his car keys, as perhaps it was his habit to do every night 
after getting home. He did not try to subdue Grant by biting him, which might have worked 
as way of achieving the intended result. The reason seems clear: wallets and car keys do not 
                                                             
12 There are various ways of diagnosing what is deviant about deviant chains. Here, I 
consider the diagnosis offered by Bishop (1989) in terms of content sensitivity, which is 
standard (certainly, not unanimous) among action theorists. Note, at any rate, that the goal 
here is not to advance a solution to the problem of deviance, but to show why assimilating 
slips to these cases will not help address the present challenge. 
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help subduing people; biting is not standard police procedure. Deploying the weapon next 
to one’s dominant hand is, in contrast, a sanctioned procedure for subduing suspects.13  
To see the significance of these points, let us distinguish two ways in which one’s 
behavior might be out of line with respect to one’s intentions and beliefs. One of them is 
shared with cases of deviance. There, the behavior is not sensitive to the content of the 
attitudes actively entertained by the agent. It is caused but not necessarily shaped by them. 
The other is characteristic of cognitively under-specified processes. Here, the behavior is 
shaped by the agent’s attitudes but, because not all the relevant attitudes are actively 
entertained at the time, it winds up being under-specified relative to some of them. Hence, 
what the agent does reflects some of the relevant contents of her mind, but not all the 
relevant ones (Reason 1992; Sellen & Norman 1992). 
Slips are cases of under-specification. This is why intention and action fail to be in 
line, given the agent’s overall beliefs. It is also why the mistake semantically approximates 
what would have been appropriate behavior. In brief, the agent sets out to act on an 
intention that can be executed in a number of ways. Normally, she has enough information 
to execute it correctly. But at the time only a subset of that information is present in her 
mind. As a consequence, the non-specificity of the intention is not correctly resolved: it is 
resolved adequately enough to rule in various related implementations, but not enough to 
rule out all the inappropriate ones. 
Think about our case again. In principle, a police officer carrying a taser has various 
ways of subduing a suspect. Which is the correct way of doing it depends upon several 
things: where the weapon is, how to deploy it, etc. Obviously, at the time of the shooting, 
Mehserle knew all this. The problem was not lack of information, but rather that the 
information he had didn’t become active in time to prevent him from following an 
internalized routine. He was trying to act quickly and many things were happening at the 
same time: he was trying to cuff Grant, his partner was shouting aggressively, people on the 
platform were protesting the arrest, etc. 
                                                             
13 Diary studies suggest that this is a robust generalization. In the slip, behavior deviates in 
familiar, context-relevant, often socially sanctioned ways (Reason & Mycielska 1982; 
Jónsdóttir et al. 2007).  
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This is not to say that the mistake was bound to happen, or that Mehserle was a mere 
victim to the situation. Not only, as mentioned earlier, it possible for slips to occur among 
other mistakes but sometimes they are actually precipitated by other mistakes. And there is 
good reason to think that this was the case here. In brief, by the time a group of police 
officers gets in the position in which Mehserle was then, it is reasonable to conjecture that 
lot of mistakes had already been made. 
 
Interference 
As we’ve seen, slips are not instances of causal deviance. But, some philosophers might 
argue that their occurrence suggests a broadly similar diagnosis. In deviant cases, some 
event beyond the person’s control (say, her nervousness) interferes with the way the she 
was disposed to execute her intentions (Enç 2004; Aguilar 2012). Similarly, in the slip, the 
habit interferes in with agent’s the exercise of her agency. As a consequence, what she does 
then doesn’t really count as falling under the umbrella of the doxastic guidance. 
It is easy to see the force of the objection if we focus on some behaviors that resemble 
slips and that clearly fit this description. With rehearsal, a familiar routine becomes 
automatized; once automatic, it operates autonomously of the agent’s control, even to the 
point of interfering with it. The classic Stroop task provides an illustration. Although 
subjects are asked to report the color of a word visually displayed, they easily wind up 
reporting the color named by the word (Stroop 1935; MacLeod 1991). There is a widely 
accepted explanation for this. Among literate people, reading is so internalized that the 
mere presence of words is enough to override the attempt to report the observed color. 
Slips embody some form of automaticity, which explains why some theorists have 
liken them to performances in the Stroop task (Norman 1981; Sripada 2019).14 While they 
happen one normally doesn’t deliberate about or really choose how to act, one typically 
acts unencumbered with the details of one’s performance, etc. At the same time, the 
                                                             
14 Here I follow the usual practice of identifying automaticity by the concurrent presence of 
certain features, none of which is by itself necessary for automaticity (Stanovich 2004; 
Moors & De Houwer 2007).  
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automaticity of the slip differs significantly from the one exemplified in the Stroop task, 
which admittedly interferes with intentional control.  In brief, rather than being autonomous 
from the agent’s intentions, the routines and habits in the slip are, in fact, subservient of 
them. 
To see this, we should notice several things. First, unlike the situation in the Stroop, 
the slip does not involve a competing concurrent attempt. Even if the agent would have 
done otherwise, at the time there are normally no signs of her trying to do it. Judged by the 
deftness of his movements, for instance, it does not seem that Mehserle was trying to reach 
for his left holster when the shooting occurred. If anything, to the extent that his actions 
unfolded effortlessly, the opposite seems to be true.  
It is true that in the slip the agent acts in ways that bypass what she otherwise would 
have wanted to do. But this does not make the habitual performance something beyond her 
control. For one thing, the habit is not mandatory or even hard to override. In fact, one of 
the hallmarks of the slip is that it has a quick and easy cure. Typically, awareness of an 
imminent slip is enough to prevent the mistake (Baars 1992; Amaya 2013). Performance in 
the Stroop task differs sharply. Even subjects cognizant of the task cannot avoid making 
mistakes or, at the very least, slowing their reading times.  
Actually, there is an important sense in which acting habitually is under the control of 
one’s intentions, a sense in which reading a word in the Stroop task is not. To be read, the 
word just needs to be in your visual field; the intention to comply with the instructions of 
the task just facilitates the stimulus-driven response. In the slip, by contrast, the intention is 
inductively connected with the behavior via a successful history of practices, a history that 
explains why the habit was acquired in the first place. Simply put, the behavior became 
habitual because it was an acceptable, or at least a sanctioned, way of executing intentions 
of the kind that prompted the agent to act.  
Consider Mehserle again. As a right-handed police officer, reaching for the weapon 
on your right holster can be an appropriate routine to have, even a life-saving one, when 
subduing an aggressive suspect. At the very least, this is why he was trained to internalize 
it, given hundreds of opportunities to practice it. Once you reach the decision to deploy 
your weapon, you do not have to think too much. As the defense expert brought for the trial 
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put it, “muscle memory” takes over in ways that allow officers to react quickly and without 
hesitation.  
Without doubt, many considerations speak against internalizing this routine. 
Arguably, using a lethal weapon should be a last resource when subduing a suspect. It 
should not be something that you do without having to think too much, much less without 
proper assurance that the suspect is really being aggressive towards you (not simply startled 
by your response to him). Yet, with the introduction of tasers as part of police equipment, 
the routine became a potential source of trouble for entirely different reasons. Here, as in 
other cases, changes in the world might undercut inductive support. With two weapons in 
your holster, you’d better not follow automatically the routine you acquired when you were 
carrying only one of them. 
We should not underestimate this point. I’ve been arguing that Mehserle’s slip should 
not be considered a mere accident but an exercise of his agency. This, however, should not 
make us blind to the fact that exercises of our agency are shaped not just by our internal 
psychology (whether this is made up by beliefs or by habits) but also by the institutional 
arrangements and practices surrounding what we do. In fact, as we will now see, it is 
precisely in the light of these arrangements and practices that our habitual actions often 
come to be, even if they turn out to be glaring mistakes, in some respect reasonable. 
 
Reasonableness 
As mentioned at the outset, the idea of doxastic guidance is meant to apply to actions done 
for a reason. At this point, it might be questioned to what extent the actions in the slip fit 
this description. To be sure, being an inadvertent mistake, the agent does not act having in 
mind a reason for doing otherwise. Her behavior is not irrational in that sense. But, in the 
absence of a relevant belief connecting her actions and her goals, one could object, there is 
nothing functioning as the agent’s reason for doing what she did.15 Hence, even if slips are 
instances of acting with an intention, they do not really constitute a challenge to doxastic 
guidance. 
                                                             
15 For the contrast between acting out of habit and acting for a reason, see Ryle (1949: 132), 
Goldman (1970: 91), Pollard (2006), Arpaly & Schroeder (2014: 80-85), and Chan (2016). 
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Obviously, some habitual behaviors are not done for a reason.16 There are also no 
considerations favoring them; if they are, they do not explain why the agent acted as she 
did. Yet in the kind of case considered here the agent acts motivated for a reason: the goal 
she intends to achieve. And, to the extent that the habit was internalized in the pursuit of 
intentions of that kind, the agent also has some reason (a bad reason, but some reason 
nonetheless) to act in accordance to it. Acting habitually, at least in such cases, is 
recommended by what person currently intends and by an internalized history of successful 
or sanctioned practices.  
Let me explain this last point by contrasting two ways of acting for a reason. 
According to a first way, an agent acts for a reason only if she judges, or would judge, her 
action as justified by the relevant considerations at hand, that is, by what she intends and 
believes then. Whether the judgment is understood as actually taking place or merely 
counterfactually, it is hard to see the slip as an instance of acting for a reason in this sense. 
Arguably, Mehserle did not have time to ask himself whether deploying the weapon in his 
right holster was the correct thing to do. Likely, based on what he believed, had he asked 
himself the question he would have immediately realized his mistake.  
According to another way of seeing the matter, however, an agent acts for a reason 
whenever her action is the product of a reasonable disposition. Briefly put, a disposition is 
reasonable if it generally tracks reasons and tracking those reasons explains, in part, why it 
was acquired. It is in this second sense that acting out of habit, even if it results in a slip, 
can count as an instance of acting for a reason (which is not the same as saying that it is an 
instance of acting for a good reasons, much less of doing what one has most reason to do). 
Whereas in some circumstances following it might lead one astray, if the habit is 
inductively supported by a history of successes, there are general considerations speaking 
in favor of acting out of it. In so far as that history explains why it was acquired, those 
considerations can function as the agent’s reasons. 
We can put this in connection to what was said earlier. As argued above, slips occur 
due to cognitive under-specification. Under-specification can have various sources: say, 
                                                             
16 Habituation might be the product of a variety of interventions (e.g., classical 
conditioning, farmacological inductions, etc.) that lie “outside the space of reasons.” It is in 
these cases like this that acting out of habit is clearly not acting for a reason.  
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one might be psychologically unable to retrieve information one has. In the case of slips, 
however, it is a function of the fact that bringing relevant information to mind is a resource 
intensive exercise. It is easily impaired if at the moment of the action one’s mind is 
elsewhere or, as in Mehserle’s case, if one is forced to act under significant time pressure.  
It is in light of these limitations that habits can connect an agent to her reasons. By 
standing in for beliefs in resource demanding situations, they dispose the agent towards 
ways of executing her intentions that have worked or have been sanctioned in the past. 
Overall, the results tend to be good: provided that the circumstances of internalization are 
congruent enough with the contexts of action. The downside, of course, is that if the 
circumstances are not congruent, and the agent overlooks the difference, a slip can result. 
Slips, then, do contrast with some paradigmatic instances of rational agency. But the 
contrast is not between acting for a reason and acting habitually. To the contrary, it is 
between two ways of understanding what it is to act for a reason—or, more precisely, two 
ways in which an agent might be in contact with her reasons.17 One of them, which goes 
hand in hand with the principle of doxastic guidance, focuses on the individual’s present 
attitudes. The action is done for a reason because it is guided by a portion of the agent’s 
psychology that latches onto considerations that justify, by her lights, its performance.  
The other notion of acting for a reason emphasizes not her present attitudes, but her 
history as an agent. There too the agent’s current psychology, as embodied in her habits, 
latches on to considerations that justify her actions, given her intentions. Yet, what makes 
these considerations reasons for her is not a set attitudes presently held: her actual 
judgments or the beliefs that would support her counterfactual judgments. It is, instead, the 
fact that the habit was internalized because, given the agent’s circumstances at the time, 
acting in those ways in the pursuit of those intentions was, institutionally speaking, an 
appropriate thing to do.  
                                                             
17 Arruda and Povinelli (2018) note how the literature on reasons for action tends to focus 
on approaches based on endorsement and justification. The present proposal is an 
alternative to this standard approach, in line with what they call a “directing,” as opposed to 
an “endorsement,” relation. Note, at any rate, that not all cases of acting for reasons in the 
absence of endorsement are historical in the sense noted above. 
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Obviously, to say that there were reasons for Mehslere to act as he did is not, in any 
shape or form, to condone or excuse what he did. A behavior can be reasonable in the light 
of a person’s beliefs, but the beliefs of the person might be false, perverse, or simply 
unreasonable. Likewise, in light of some institutional arrangement, a certain habitual 
behavior might be reasonable. But the existence of the institutional arrangement and the 
fact that it sanctions some behavior as within procedure is no excuse, morally or otherwise, 
for behaving poorly. 
 
Dispositions 
I now turn to the second way of fending off the challenge we identified at beginning of our 
discussion.  
According to it, even though slips are instances of intentional agency, they are not 
counter-examples to doxastic guidance. Rather, being used to follow a given routine, the 
agent comes to believe, on inductive grounds, that the behavior she is about to undertake 
(under the appropriate descriptions) helps achieve what she intends then. On this view, 
slipping is both acting with an intention and acting for a reason. But that’s only because it 
is one way of acting under a false belief. 
It is easy to see why reducing slips to doxastic mistakes might be appealing here. 
Doing it allows harmonizing their existence with orthodox action theory. Further, given a 
dispositional view of beliefs, such as the one many of these theorists hold, the reduction 
would seem independently motivated.18 If, as argued above, the habits behind slips are 
inductively supported dispositions, slipping due to a habit seems like a way of acting in 
accordance to one’s beliefs.   
A closer look, however, shows that the reduction is problematic. Simply, attributing 
the agent a false belief yields predictions that are not generally observed when it comes to 
slips. That is, whereas Mehserle’s behavior at the instant of the shooting might be 
consistent, say, with him believing that his taser was in his right holster, the latter is 
inconsistent with his overall behavior and the things he could have done then. Thus, 
                                                             
18 For dispositional accounts of belief, see Armstrong (1973), Stalnaker (1984), 
Schwitzgebel (2010) and Buckwalter et al (2015). 
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attributing the belief helps rationalize the mistake at the cost of getting wrong the agent’s 
larger psychological profile. 
To see why, begin with the idea that beliefs are multi-track dispositions (Stich 1978; 
Evans 1985; Weiskopf 2008). They dispose one to act in ways that systematically depend 
upon one’s background attitudes. Despite wide disagreements about the nature of beliefs, I 
take it that most theorists nowadays would accept this as definitory of beliefs. Historically 
speaking, this is why the behaviorist approach to them never worked out. Because beliefs 
guide action by becoming inferentially integrated with other attitudes, there are no 
behavioral markers for them. Their manifestations normally include vastly different pieces 
of behavior.  
Evidently, some idealization is going on here. Inferential integration takes time and 
effort. Some beliefs therefore will inevitably fall short of exhibiting this kind of 
systematicity: they will be too short-lived or too marginal to ever get integrated. Still, even 
within those limitations, beliefs tend to have a broad range of potential influence. At a 
minimum, because they can be extrapolated and combined with other attitudes, their 
potential influence extends counterfactually beyond a circumscribed type of behavior or 
situation. 19 
With this in mind we can return the discussion of our cases. The first thing to note 
here is that the dispositions behind slips exhibit the opposite tendency. Slips are 
characteristically island mistakes, which means that beyond the agent’s actions at the time, 
there is normally no systematic confusion to be explained. This much became evident in 
Mehserle’s case: that reaching for the weapon in his right holster and deploying it when 
intending to tase a suspect was an isolated incident. He did not repeatedly confused his 
taser with his gun or, less dramatically, was prone to confuse left and right. Perhaps, if that 
were the case, there would have been some grounds for attributing him a false belief. 
Suppose, though, that contrary to what I’ve said Mehserle shot Grant because he 
came to believe momentarily that reaching for the weapon in his right holster was 
                                                             
19 Schwitzgebel discusses examples of beliefs that are not fully integrated with the 
behavioral trajectories of their subjects: what he calls cases of in-between belief. For such 
cases, he seems to agree with the point made above: “we believe that P,” he says, “if our 
actions and reactions generally reflect a P-ish take on the world” (2010: 541).  
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appropriate means to tase him. Then, even if that belief were only short lived, it could have 
resulted in many other actions. Given his knowledge that he was carrying each weapon in 
an opposite side of his belt, for example, he could have reached for his left holster if he had 
instead decided to shoot Grant. Or combined with his belief that the taser was set up in a 
cross-draw configuration, he could have reached for it with his left hand.  
No doubt, there is much of Mehserle’s psychology that nobody knows about. Still, 
these imagined scenarios are unlikely. For both of them would have him behave in ways 
that run contrary to a generalization empirically confirmed now and then. Namely, slips 
show robust frequency-effects (Reason 1990, ch. 3; Sellen 1990): the appropriate actions 
tend to be replaced not just by associated ones, but by those that have been more intensely 
rehearsed in the past. A novel behavior taking the place of an appropriate one is certainly 
an exception. 
The point can be made with a useful rule of thumb: if a mistake shows enough 
integration with the agent’s present attitudes, that speaks against it being slip. In part, this is 
a restriction to avoid false positives. But it also reflects the psychology behind the mistake. 
The agent’s behavior is the result of becoming disposed to follow a certain routine when 
having a specific type of goal in mind. So, unless there is a further story of habituation, one 
will not observe the agent making a slip that involves the same behavior but in the pursuit 
of a different type of goal. Nor will one observe the slip eventuating in novel behavior.20  
If anything, Mehserle’s mistake looks like an episode of lack of integration. His 
actions resulted from a disposition formed through rehearsal, which never got integrated 
with his acquired beliefs about taser deployment, the location of each of his weapons, etc. 
In fact, compared to those beliefs, his previously acquired routine seemed to be 
systemically isolated from many of his relevant attitudes. Significantly, during taser 
training Mehserle and the rest of the police officers were not allowed to bring their guns 
with them. In the ten hours that the training lasted, none of them ever got to practice using 
the taser while carrying a firearm on their weapon belt. 
                                                             
20 Discussing the “Moses illusion,” Sorensen (2011) argues that some slips can eventually 
result in variegated behavior. This is indeed possible. If a slip is not corrected, the agent can 
become disposed to form a belief accordant with her behavior. See Audi (1994) for the 




But one might question whether this lack of integration actually raises a problem for the 
doxastic interpretation sketched earlier. After all, human minds can be somewhat 
fragmented (Lewis 1982; Stalnaker 1984; Egan 2008).21 Because one can fail to see how 
one’s beliefs connect with each other, neglect some of their implications, or temporarily 
forget things, one’s beliefs sometimes do not form a coherent whole. Some of them, in fact, 
can wind up non-accidentally isolated from the bulk of one’s attitudes.     
Clearly, psychologically realistic notions of belief need not live up to our rational 
ideals. Hence, we should not reject off hand the possibility of someone’s mind being 
fragmented to the point of one of her beliefs operating only in a narrow type of context. At 
the same time, believing something involves being disposed to regard it as true (Railton 
1994; Velleman 2000). Which means that even agents with fragmented belief systems are 
sensitive to pressures of integration and coherence. Far from being permanent partitions, 
doxastic fragments tend to get integrated with the agent’s overall psychology when the 
right sort of information is presented to her.  
The slip, however, is also different in this regard. Surely, the mistake is evidence of 
the agent’s mind being fragmented in some sense. At least, it indicates that some of her 
behavior and beliefs were not properly aligned. Yet, their misalignment is not simply the 
consequence of the way information circulates in one’s mind, but of something deeper. 
Unlike beliefs, habits are past-dependent dispositions: they dispose agents to act in 
accordance with a history of internalization and rehearsal. And, because of this, they tend 
not be sensitive to the kind of evidential pressures that normally shape one’s doxastic 
attitudes.  
                                                             
21 Dispositionalists about belief have traditionally been the advocates the fragmentation 
hypothesis. There is a recent representationalist version of it in Mandelbaum (2014) and 
Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum (2017). The main issue dividing these approaches is whether 
beliefs are relations to structured representations, not so much the issue of fragmentation. 
Accordingly, their discussion can be set aside here. 
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Think about the things that normally work (or not) as measures to prevent the slip. 
These are not the things that typically serve as antidotes for fragmentation. For instance, 
unlike cases where a person fails to see how her beliefs can add up to an inconsistency, 
explaining the conflict is normally unnecessary to cure a slip. Once you attend to it, the 
misalignment of behavior and beliefs becomes obvious without explanation. Likewise, 
anticipating the consequences of one’s actions or being reminded ahead of time about what 
counts as an appropriate implementation of one’s intentions are hardly effective methods to 
prevent the slip. It is much better to re-train oneself or to set up physical barriers that 
prevent one from following the habitual routine.  
This was a controversial aspect of Mehserle’s trial. As the prosecution insisted, 
during their training period officers were explicitly warned about possible gun/taser 
confusions. To avoid them, they were instructed to carry their weapons on opposite sides of 
their holsters (as Mehserle was doing the night of the shooting) or to set their tasers up to 
be reached with their non-dominant hand. The assumption was that if the officers were 
warned and the two weapons were far enough apart they were not going to get confused 
about their deployment.  
Unfortunately, none of this made a difference in the practical training undergone by 
the officers. As we have seen, they were not allowed to train while carrying their guns. 
Perhaps more surprising, anticipation of the mistake made little difference in actual police 
procedure. At the beginning of every shift, they were randomly assigned holster belts with 
either of two possible configurations: each weapon on a different side of their body vs. both 
weapons on the same side with tasers set up for non-dominant draw. This prevented the 
officers from internalizing new routines that would have kept apart, as much as possible, 
taser and gun deployment.  
We can put the point in more precise terms. To the extent that beliefs are truth-
oriented dispositions, they tend to be sensitive to global pressures of coherence. For the 
same reason, belief fixation and revision tend to be isotropic processes: any relevant 
information can potentially lead to acquiring or abandoning a given belief (Fodor 1983; 
Burnston & Cohen 2015).  By contrast, being past–dependent, the dispositions behind slips 
tend to be impervious to coherence pressures arising from upcoming or newly acquired 
information. That is why, although becoming aware of an imminent slip might be enough 
 25 
to block the manifestation of the habit, learning that a habitual routine is inappropriate does 
not make the disposition to follow it go away. 
Again, we should be careful with the way we handle exceptions here. Some 
episodes of belief acquisition are apparently unencumbered by evidence (Gilbert 1991; 
Mandelbaum 2014). Entertaining a proposition, in those cases, automatically leads to 
believing it; rejecting it, by contrast, requires effort. Also as cognitive dissonance theorists 
have noted, acquired beliefs can sometimes be impervious to coherence pressures. Under 
certain circumstances, for instance, agents are known to persevere in their beliefs, despite 
receiving good evidence of their being incoherent (Ross et al. 1975; McFarland et al. 2007).  
Interestingly, rather than supporting a doxastic interpretation, these exceptions 
provide an even sharper contrast. Agents who slip effortlessly recognize their mistakes once 
these are pointed to them. What seems automatic in their case is the recognition that they 
knew better. On the other hand, agents who persevere in their beliefs often try re-
interpreting their behavior or coming up with auxiliary hypotheses to harmonize the 
conflicting beliefs. This, however, is the opposite of what is commonly observed in the slip. 
Consider Mehserle one last time. As soon as he shot Grant, he brought his hands to 
his head. Although nobody knows what went through his mind then, it does not seem that 
he doubted he had made a mistake. Mehserle did not try to find an excuse for what he did 
(the gun went off by accident). He did not try to justify the use of his firearm (I felt I was in 
danger). Nor even was he left in the train platform wondering where things went wrong 
(where was my taser again?). It was as though he had no way of rationalizing his behavior. 
As one witness of the incident described him: “The officer who pulled the trigger was in 
shock. [He] had a look on his face similar to ‘Oh my god! I can’t believe this happened.’ 
Like the deer in the headlights look.”  
…….. 
 
Let us take stock. I have argued so far that slips are instances of acting with an intention. 
While the actions that constitute them are guided by the agent’s habits, as we have now 
seen, they do not seem reducible to her beliefs. Habits, unlike beliefs, are not multi-track or 
truth-oriented dispositions. Therefore, they do not exhibit the patterns of integration and the 
openness to evidential pressures characteristic of beliefs. This, I think, is sufficient to 
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establish the major point that we initially set out to make about slips being exceptions to 
doxastic guidance. Before concluding, however, we should address two further objections 
that cast doubt over the significance of the present challenge. Discussing them will also 
allow us to generalize the points made so far with respect to exercises of agency that do not 
necessarily involve slips.  
 
Rationalization 
Doxastic guidance, as mentioned at the outset, is a principle concerning instrumental 
rationalization. So, one way of resisting the force of the challenge compatible with what has 
been argued so far is to oppose up front the idea that habits, as discussed here, can play the 
rationalizing role uniquely assigns to beliefs. There are various ways of developing this line 
of thought. But Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder (2014: §3.7) have advanced a view 
of this sort worth considering here. According to them, unlike beliefs, habits do not have 
contents and, because of this, they cannot rationalize actions. Hence, although habitual 
actions might count as intentional and habits might not be reducible to beliefs, acting 
habitually is not a candidate for rationalization.  
Obviously, the notion of content is a complicated one. It is also disputable what 
exactly it means for a belief, dispositionally understood, to be contentful. Still, even 
granting that habits do not have contents, the skeptical conclusion Arpaly and Schroeder 
push does not follow. It is certainly true that habits, by themselves, cannot rationalize 
actions. But, together with the intentions motivating the agent to act, they can rationalize 
what she does. 
Think in more detail about the idea of rationalization. First, rationalization is 
supposed to mark a logical relation. This is why the practical syllogism often gets invoked 
in this context. As it is often put, intentions and beliefs are meant to relate to the intentional 
description of the action they rationalize in the way that the premises and conclusions of the 
syllogism are related to each other. In addition, rationalization is supposed to occur in an 
explanatory context. That is, whatever rationalizes the action does not merely show that the 
action makes logical sense; its being thus logical for the agent also has to be part of the 
explanation of the action. 
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As we have seen with Mehserle, agents sometimes cannot offer a rationalization for 
their slips. That is, they often find themselves unable to articulate a justification for what 
they did, or offer any sort of explanation that would make their behavior a bit less puzzling. 
This, however, should not be taken as evidence that there is no logical structure to their 
behavior, or that such structure does not play a role in producing it. An agent can act in way 
that seemed rational to her, even if she unable to articulate afterwards exactly why it 
seemed so to her. An explanatory rationalization, in other words, need not be available for 
first-person report.22 
Start with the logical aspect of the rationalization relation. Let us grant that in the 
absence of beliefs, there can be no deductively valid pattern of reasoning by reference to 
which the relation between intentions and actions can be articulated. Plainly, if habits do 
not have contents, they do not to have associated truth conditions. Still, there is an 
acceptable pattern of reasoning connecting the action and the intention that serves the 
purposes of rationalization. Specifically, an agent in the habit of performing some type of 
action by way of executing a general intention can reasonably conclude by default that there 
is reason to perform that action on the grounds of currently having an intention of that 
kind.23  
This type of reasoning need not happen in one’s head. But the same holds with 
respect to actions rationalized by beliefs: agents need not go through the syllogism that 
rationalizes them. The point of invoking the argument is not to describe a psychological 
process but to make clear the logical relation holding between the items over which a 
psychological process ranges. The argument is meant to display the logic that led the agent 
to see the action as a reasonable way of executing the intention. 
In the slip, then, habits are related to intentions and actions in the way that defaults 
relate premises and conclusions in a piece of default reasoning. That is, they do not 
                                                             
22 This is not because the agent cannot access her state of mind at the time of the mistake. 
She can access it in whichever way it is required by first person knowledge. Still, having 
realized that she made a mistake, she might not be able articulate a coherent picture of her 
state of mind at the time. What was I thinking?   
23 For discussion of how default processes can shape action at different levels, see Bach 
(1984) and Pollock (2008), who follow Reiter’s formal treatment (1980).  
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function as premises from which the conclusions can be derived, say, the premise that some 
available course of action is the best way to satisfy one’s current intentions. Instead, by 
reasonably disposing the agent towards some ways of executing those intentions, they 
sanction a straight transition from intentions to actions. As in a piece of default reasoning, 
they set the actions as defaults to be followed when pursuing associated goals unless 
considerations for doing otherwise comes to mind.  
Further, these transitions make the mistake intelligible: the agent errs because she 
follows a default way of executing the kind of intention she had in mind. They help see 
why a reasonable agent could have made the mistake: the considerations for doing 
otherwise didn’t come to mind in time. Also, they also explain why it seemed desirable for 
the agent to act as she did. Acting on an acquired habit might not secure intention 
satisfaction but, very much like reasoning by default, it is good enough in demanding 
circumstances. Last but not least, focusing on these transitions can also help us see how the 
institutions that surround us can play a large role in structuring our agency. As Mehserle’s 
case illustrates, they contribute to the rationalization of what we do by shaping up what we 
take to our defaults to be.    
In sum, if rationalization is understood as something that only contentful states can 
do, then, as Arpaly and Schroeder claim, habits might be unable to play the rationalizing 
role traditionally assigned to beliefs. But, as we just have seen, the possibility of 
rationalizing an action need not be bound by this requirement. Some item in the agent’s 
psychology can structure what she does by disposing her to make certain logical transitions 
from intention to action. When this is the case, as with the habits behind the slip, 
rationalization and, thus, action guidance need not involve beliefs. 
 
Glitches 
The idea of doxastic guidance is part of a project of providing a unified theory of rational 
agency. If the preceding remarks are on the right track, however, unification of this sort 
seems rather unlikely. Sometimes beliefs rationalize our actions. But, other times, as when 
we slip due to a habit, what we do is rationalized by dispositions of a different kind. There, 
forms of reasoning different from the practical syllogism provide a model for understanding 
what rationalization involves.  
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  Some action theorists will no doubt balk at this conclusion because of its 
implications for the unification project. Perhaps, slips are not oddities in the life of human 
agents: everyone has had first-hand experience with them. Yet, they are not the way things 
ought to be or the way things normally are. Here, these theorists would argue, lies the 
problem. One cannot derive an ought from an is. But neither can one derive from our 
mistakes a view of our rational agency. As far as successful exercise our agency go, 
doxastic guidance remains a suitable generalization.  
It would take considerable space to give a complete answer to this objection. But, 
for present purposes, it helps to distinguish two things that are relevant to conceptualize a 
mistake. First, there are the standards by which the performance gets evaluated, that is, by 
which it can be said to result in a success or a mistake. These are standards by which, say, 
our performances are regarded as morally good, illegal, etc. There are, on the other hand, 
the standards by which one can evaluate the processes that lead to those performances. It is 
typically in terms of these that normal and abnormal processing gets distinguished, whether 
the abnormality is pathological or due to a temporary glitch. 24  
Considered in the abstract, it is clear that these standards can come apart. An 
unsuccessful performance may in principle result from an otherwise impeccable process. 
To take one concrete example from a different domain, in their landmark studies of 
inductive reasoning, Kahneman and Tversky (1973; 1982) observed how their subjects’ 
intuitive judgments violated basic probabilistic principles. The violations, however, they 
claimed, did not seem to result from misapplications of the probability calculus, but rather 
from their reliance on a limited number of heuristics that would be reasonable to use in 
naturalistic scenarios.   
In the case of the slip, the situation is analogous. What the agent does then is 
sometimes morally offensive or illegal; it is always contrary to her intentions and beliefs. 
Yet, it does not follow from this that the slip is the result of a glitch or a lapse in an 
                                                             
24 The distinction between the evaluation of performances and processes lies at the of 
Herbert Simon’s (1957, 1983) classic distinction between substantive and procedural 
rationality. Michael Bratman (1987: 5.2) also draws a similar distinction between the 
rationality of having general policies for (not) reconsidering plans and the adequacy of 
specific episodes of (non) reconsideration. 
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otherwise foolproof process of intention execution—the one that actually explains what 
happens in the successful case. There is, as we have seen, enough systematicity to the 
mistake to view it as the result of a process of intention execution of a different kind.  
With this distinction in mind, we can now return the objection. There is, as the 
unificationist would claim, a sense in which slips are not the way things ought to be. The 
performance of the agent falls short of standards to which it makes sense to hold rational 
agents accountable, at least in principle: to execute one’s intentions in line with one’s 
believes. The objection, however, loses its force, once we focus on the processes by which 
our intentions can be executed. Slips, as we have seen, help dissociate two different kinds 
of psychological processes that are relevant here, each of which can support rational agency 
in a different way.      
On one of them, beliefs direct agents to achieve their goals by disposing them to act 
in ways that make sense, given the information they have at the time. What they do then is 
rational in the light of that information. On the other, habits make salient certain courses of 
action as default ways of acting, on the grounds that those ways have worked in the past. In 
the light of our limitations and the constraints with which we act, this kind of inductive 
support speaks in favor of its rationality. 
Importantly, even if most actions in everyday life accord with our beliefs, this is not 
enough grounds for thinking that doxastic guidance is what’s normal there. Felicitous 
performances are poor at revealing overlooked distinctions at a process-level. Slips, on the 
other hand, by breaking the monopoly exercised by belief-based explanations of intentional 
action, open the door to a flood of potential counter-examples to doxastic guidance. Beliefs 
surely guide some successful performances. Yet, when beliefs and habits align with each 
other, for the reasons sketched here, one need not assume without additional evidence that 
the former, and not the latter, are the doing the guidance.  
As I said, it would take much more space to develop these points properly. This 
would require, for instance, a more substantive discussion of the methodology of using 
mistakes in the re-construction of psychological process. It would also require spelling out 
a theory of everyday habitual successful agency. These are things that I cannot do here—I 
do them elsewhere. What has been said so far, however, should be enough to take the 
challenge slips raise seriously. 
 31 
Obviously, in addition to the possibilities considered above, there are other ways of 
defending the principle of doxastic guidance. Say, one might qualify the principle with 
ceteris paribus clauses or one could try to explain the slip by attributing the agent some 
tacit belief that would guide her action. The problem with these responses is that, although 
they seem appealing at first, once developed, they lose their intuitive force.  
It is not clear, for instance, what in general ceteris paribus clauses are supposed to 
exclude. However, if guidance by habits is not necessarily defective or abnormal, and it is 
possibly pervasive, as we have just seen, excluding it from an over-arching principle of 
instrumental rationalization seems ad hoc. Likewise, despite its ring of familiarity, it is hard 
to know what the expression “tacit belief” refers to, except something that is like a belief 
but falls shorts of being one. 25 It is harder to know how tacit beliefs rationalize and whether 
they do it in the way in which explicit beliefs are supposed to rationalize actions. 
In fact, for the reasons just discussed, dismissing the challenge merely by gesturing 
at these possibilities seems needlessly conservative. By doing it one might get to preserve a 
cherished principle, or (at least) a version of it, or (at the very least) the letter of it. But, as 
we have just seen, one runs the risk of not fully appreciating the broad range of human 
agency. More importantly, one risks failing to see how easily avoidable and yet 
catastrophic mistakes, such as Mehserle’s slip, can be part of how we exercise our agency 
in the particular situations in which we find ourselves. 
 
Conclusion 
Slips are exceptions to doxastic guidance. Or so I have argued here. I’ve shown that prima 
facie plausible ways of fending off the challenge do not work. Some of them seem plausible 
only because they overlook some features of slips that are necessary to explain what kind of 
mistake they are and why they happen. Others seem plausible only because they presuppose 
a narrow understanding of some core features characteristic of intentional agency.  
                                                             
25 I can’t discuss here the semantics of ceteris paribus clauses or to develop an account of 
what a tacit attitude of belief (or desire) could be. But, for a sustained discussion of these 
issues in contexts similar to this one, see (Gauker 2005; Amaya 2013) 
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In the end, the discussion has served to sketch a model of how a psychology of 
habits can be integrated in an account of intentional agency. Acting habitually, as we have 
seen, is not antithetic to acting for a reason; habits sometimes function as rationalizing 
dispositions. Even though much remains to be said on this point, these are worthy results. 
With its reliance on doxastic guidance, traditional action theory has failed to recognize the 
distinctive psychology behind habitual action and with it the possibilities of erring that 
come with exercises of our agency. 
Throughout this paper, I have discussed the 2009 killing of Oscar Grant by the 
police officer, Johannes Mehserle, and constructed an argument that has now shown that 
the incident was not merely an accident, but rather the product of a mistake the officer 
made. As deplorable as the officer’s actions were, however, I have also emphasized that the 
mistake was not simply due to his individual state of mind, but also was, in part, due to a 
series of institutionally sanctioned practices, having to do with the way officers are 
equipped and trained. This is not to say that Mehserle had no control over his actions or 
could not have acted differently; obviously, much remains to be said regarding how our 
individual agency and our social arrangements operate in relation to each other. The points 
raised here, then, should be taken into account to evaluate not only what happened in 
Oakland that night, but they should also be employed to figure out what to do to prevent 
similar mistakes going forward.26  
  
                                                             
26 Versions of this paper were presented at the Berlin School of Mind and Brain, the 
Gothenburg Workshop on Moral Responsibility, the Institute Jean Nicod, and the 
Universities of San Diego, Sheffield, Tubingen, and Washington University in St. Louis. Al 
Mele, Arnon Cahen, Sarah Robins, John Doris, Neil Levy, Roy Sorensen, Manuel Vargas, 
and Allison Wolff gave me feedback for which I am extremely grateful. I also want to 
thank the anonymous reviewers that helped shape this paper into its final version. Work on 
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